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Trist: Winnipeg Grenadiers at Hong Kong

Lieutenant-Colonel George Trist
Officer Commanding, 1st Battalion Winnipeg Grenadiers
North Point Camp, Hong Kong, 30 April 1941

T

he writer commences this report knowing
full well that a report containing criticisms
or accusations is bound to be read with a certain
amount of skepticism particularly if it is written
in opposition to an official report submitted by
a much higher authority.

Two important factors have decided me to
compile this report without further delay and
while still a prisoner of war and subject to search
at any time by the Japanese authorities (although
they have not done so as yet). The first and most
urgent one is the necessity for a very accurate
recording of events as they occurred, this would
not have been so important but for the fact that
it has become very evident that we (The Canadian
Forces) are being blamed by the Imperial troops
for the early fall of Hong Kong. And while it is
not definitely known that the Imperial staff are
going to adapt this attitude in their official report
every precaution must be taken to ensure that
any attempt to make 'C Force (Canadians) the
scape goat is adequately challenged by a
submission of the facts while they are still fresh
in the memory. The second is that the G.S.0.1.
Col Nunam informed the late Lieut Col Sutcliffe
before we left Sham-Shui-Po camp that he had
already commenced compilation of the official
report.
Owing to the very early death of Brigadier
Lawson and the loss of any record or report he
may have written, Coupled with the fact that the
two Canadian Battalions operated in different
Editor's Note: This is an abridged version of this report.
The full report can be ordered from our website for a nominal
charge: <www.canadianmilitaryhistory.com>

Brigades and were entirely separate throughout
the campaign it will be necessary for Lieut Col
Home who commanded the Royal Rifles of
Canada and myself to submit separate reports
in order to have a complete picture of the
operations as far as the Island is concerned and
I would also point out the fact that during the
whole of the operations the late Lieut Col
Sutcliffe was in command of this Battalion at
the battle box while I was detailed to take care
of the administration, reports, returns etc at the
Battalion Headquarters except for one phase of
the battle when I was sent up to Mount Cameron
in command of two composite Companies
allotted for the defence of that position. And I
must rely therefore on the reports of the Adjutant
who was with Col Sutcliffe during the whole of
the period, a n d t h e v a r i o u s c o m p a n y
commanders to cover the various points of which
I have no personal knowledge.
At the outbreak of the war 'C Force was
assigned to the protection of the south coast of
the Island of Hong Kong and with the exception
of a small support role during the withdrawal.
U n d e r t a k e n by 'D' C o m p a n y Winnipeg
Grenadiers, they took no part in the battle for
the mainland and the withdrawal to the Island,
And any reference to the operations there is
made on information obtained from senior
Officers of the units taking part and is submitted
as such....
Immediately on arrival at Hong Kong we
were handed the defence scheme and a guide
was allotted to us, on the following day we
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A mother runs along the tracks to say goodbye to her son
as he leaves with the Winnipeg Grenadiers, 5 June 1940.

And a few scattered beach defence guns, Anti
personal mines, And Barbed wire on the
beaches. (4) Infantry strong points situated in
the hills above the coast line to stop penetration
and to localize any landing. (5) A reserve force
to counter attack and isolate or destroy any
enemy landing parties. Though as regards the
latter force it remained a paper force to the
end....

commenced an extensive reconnaissance of the
defence positions. One point which struck us
very forcibly from the outset was the amount of
last minute preparations such as the drawing of
extensive mobilization stores and completion of
vital field works, wiring, mine laying, and road
blocks, and ammunition and equipment to be
drawn and distributed. Very little of which was
allowed to be done until complete mobilization
was ordered one day before the outbreak of war
with Japan.
The front covered by The Winnipeg
Grenadiers extended from the East end of
Repulse Bay to the foot of Mount Davis on the
N.W. end of t h e I s l a n d , a frontage of
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 13000 yds not i n c l u d i n g
Aberdeen Island which was also held by our
troops.
The defence scheme was based on five lines
of defence. (1) The Navy and off shore lines of
defence in the way of mine fields. (2) The Coast
defence guns. (3) The Beach defence, Consisting
of pill boxes covering all possible landing points,
22
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The whole defence scheme was designed to
meet a major attack for the sea. The possibility
of an attack coming from the Japanese occupied
territory to the North of Kowloon on the
mainland was not apparently given any serious
consideration until just prior to the outbreak of
war as evidenced by the fact that wiring and field
works on the mainland had not nearly been
completed when hostilities broke out. This was
no doubt due to gross under-estimation of the
Japanese forces in the area. General Maltby told
us in a lecture shortly after our arrival that the
Japanese had only about 5000 troops with very
little Artillery support opposing us from the
North. And further that their troops were ill
equipped and not used to night fighting. He also
said that their aircraft was for the most part
obsolete and their pilots very mediocre, Unable
to do dive bombing owing to poor eyesight. All
of which proved to be incorrect. The unfortunate
part was that apparently the staff believed it and
directed their preparations accordingly although
it should not have been very difficult to obtain
correct information had their intelligence staff
been functioning as it should have been.
There can have been no doubt that if the
mainland force failed to deny Devils Peak to the
enemy a successful landing on the N.E. Coast of
the Island was not only possible but very
probable. And if the enemy were prepared to
sacrifice sufficient troops it became a certainty.
The defence force of the Colony consisted of
two Imperial Battalions (1 Infantry, 1 Machine
Gun) both at Garrison strength, Two Indian Rifle
Battalions also at Garrison strength, and two
Canadian Battalions. In addition to these there
was the Hong Kong Volunteer C o r p s ,
(approximately 1500 all ranks) made up of seven
companies of Infantry, and Artillery....The Naval
units consisted of three small Destroyers (Two
2
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Above: Personnel of the Winnipeg Grenadiers entraining
en route to Hong Kong, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 25 October
1941.
Right: Lieutenant-Colonel J.L.R. Sutcliffe, (centre)
Commanding Officer of the Winnipeg Grenadiers, greets
one of his junior officers prior to the battalion's departure
from Winnipeg, 25 October 1941. It is believed the officer
on the left is Major George Trist.

of which left for Singapore at the outbreak of
war). Three river gun boats and sundry small
craft such as mine laying tugs, And six M.T.Bs.
Finally there was the air force consisting of three
old biplanes and two old seaplanes all of which
were destroyed on the ground the first morning
of the war.
The e s t i m a t e s of the J a p a n e s e Army
opposing us vary from Two to Five divisions. A
Japanese Officer told the late Lieut Col Sutcliffe
and myself that they employed two divisions on
the Island and had three more in reserve on the
mainland. And that two hundred guns were
operating against the Island.
Owing to the fact that all papers of a military
nature or of value were ordered destroyed before
surrender I have to rely on my own and the
memory of those associated with me during the
fighting for actual dates and details.
The defence of Hong Kong was divided into
two phases. The battle for the mainland, and
the actual defence of the Island. The mainland
territory consisted of a strip of very mountainous
country stretching twenty five miles north of
Kowloon known as the New Territories and
ending in a mountainous promptory known as
Devils Peak across the harbour 400 yds to the
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001

N.E. of the Island. The defence plan was to hold
a line known as Gin drinkers line which crossed
the peninsula as it narrowed down about five
miles north of the city of Kowloon. This was
considered a very strong line being fortified by
frequent pill boxes on an extremely mountainous
terrain. Two roads and a railroad lead from
Kowloon to the north border of the territories
One road running up the East side. The other
along the sea shore and curving N.E. from the
23
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Officers of "C" Force aboard SS Awatea en
route to Hong Kong, October 1941.
I. to r.: Major C.A. Lyndon, Brigade Major;
Brigadier J.K. Lawson, Brigade Commander;
Colonel P. Hennessey, Senior Administrative
Officer; Captain H.S.A. Bush, Staff Captain.

coast to join the other at Fan-Ling. All of which
were heavily mined and prepared for demolition.
But which through some error or oversight were
not destroyed at the time of the evacuation). It
was expected that this line would hold for at least
two weeks thus giving time for the complete
military evacuation of Kowloon, After which if
driven in the line would be re-established across
Devils Peak and held. Thus denying access to
the narrow channel separating the Island from
the mainland, also to the high mountain range
which overlooks a great deal of the Island
providing wonderful artillery observation and
very good gun positions at the closest possible
range....

T

he Island is about ten miles long and seven
miles wide and is very mountainous. The
city of Victoria lies on a very narrow strip of
waterfront not more than a mile wide along the
north shore with the main ridge of mountains
rising immediately behind to a height of 2000 ft
at the peak. These are broken at intervals by a
series of gaps, 8 in number giving access to the
sough part of the Island. From this ridge the
terrain slopes sharply down to the south shore
with sundry smaller mountains spotting the
southern coast. The ground in between is a series
of north and south saw-back ridges. There are
four small Islands close to the south coast the
main one being Aberdeen which consists of one
high mountain. The coast line all round the East,
South, and West coast is very hilly and rugged
and with the exception of a few small beaches
24
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inaccessible except in dead calm weather and
even then only be expert mountain troops. The
road problem on the Island is very bad. One
highway running around the Island close to the
shore most of the way. There is only one
additional highway running north and south
from happy valley (Victoria) on the north shore
through Wan-Nei-Chong Gap down to Deep Water
Bay on the south coast cutting the Island in half.
All other roads outside Victoria are little better
than very narrow trails and are in most cases
impassable to motor traffic.
Another important feature of both the Island
and the mainland were the water catchments
which consisted of deep culverts six to ten feet
deep running round the mountain sides at high
levels to catch the torrential rainfall, and
gradually sloping down to the reservoirs. This
was the water system and incidentally provided
the Japanese easy covered approaches to all the
high points on b o t h the Island and the mainland.
A further very important tactical feature was
the large mountainous area the N.E. of the Island
about two miles in from the coast line offering
cover for thousands of troops which was both
unpopulated and with the exception of small
bodies of troops on the coastal outskirts not held
at all. It was through this area that the main
attack on the capturing the west Brigade
headquarters. Three companies were allotted to
cover out extensive frontage with one company
in reserve at Brigade Headquarters, Wit the
prime task of assisting the civil powers in
Victoria. Its secondary task was the defence of
4
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Brigade H.Q. and the main north and south
road across the Island. All positions were
section posts and ranged form two hundred to
eight hundred yds apart. The majority of the
posts were small trench system, High up on
the steep slopes above the shore line with
access only from the main highway running
round the Island in front of their positions,
Platoon headquarters were situated with one of
the section posts, Communication being by
runner with the other posts except in a few
c a s e s w h e r e we rigged up p h o n e
communications of our own, these were very
limited owing to the great distance and the
shortage of wire. A runner would in most cases
have to traverse exceedingly hilly and difficult
country to reach the section posts with every
possibility of losing his way of being shot at
approaching the position from the front. There
were very few of the positions which could be
reached by runner under 15 minutes. Battalion
Headquarters was situated at Wan-Chai-Gap
on the line of ridges where a small reserve from
Headquarters Company were retained with the
transported and administrative personal.

On the evening of Dec 6, 1941, a general
mobilization was o r d e r e d by t h e C h i n a
Command and all units ordered to man their
battle positions. The following day Dec 7/41
at about 1000 hrs The Winnipeg Grenadiers
left the Hankow Barracks Sham-Shui-Po, And
were transported by ferry from Bamboo pier to
R.A.A.S.C. Chamber docks Victoria, From where
they proceeded to the Company areas under
c o m m a n d of t h e v a r i o u s C o m p a n y
C o m m a n d e r s . All Coy's h a d r e p o r t e d to
Battalion Headquarters as having occupied their
positions by 1600 hrs. At about 0430 hrs Dec
8th, Fortress Headquarters advised the Battalion
Headquarters by telephone that we were at war
with Japan and that hostilities had commenced.
At day break Kai-Tak airport was bombed by the
Japanese and all our planes destroyed on the
ground. They then turned their attention to
Sham-Shui-Po camp which was heavily bombed
but as this place had been evacuated the previous
day by all troops with the exception of the rear
party casualties were light. During the day all
stored and equipment were removed from there
to the Island by the rear party and this camp
completely evacuated....

Troops of "C" Force march through Kowloon on their way to the
Sham Shui Po Barracks, Hong Kong, 16 November 1941.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001

5

Canadian Military History, Vol. 10 [2001], Iss. 4, Art. 3

T

he evacuation of the mainland defence force
took place during the night of 12/13 Dec.
So that in place of holding out as originally
planned all defence of the mainland was
abandoned just five days after the outbreak of
war (including Devils Peak which was to have
been held indefinitely at all costs). This led the
way open for an attack on the Island from the
mainland across the very narrow channel
mentioned above, And which was finally effected
by the Japanese during the night of 18/19 Dec
after a heavy bombardment of the shore defences
and under cover of a heavy smoke screen caused
by some of the oil tanks being set on fire.

On the withdrawal form the mainland the
forces on the Island were divided in two. (East
& West Brigades). West Brigade remaining under
command of Brigadier Lawson who had in
addition to the forces already mentioned one of
the Indian Battalions who were evacuated from
the mainland who were placed in Victoria for
the defence of the city, But lost The Royal Rifles
of Canada and two Companies of the Hong Kong
Volunteers who were now included in East
Brigade under Brigadier Wallace.
During the whole period of the Battle for the
Island Fortress Headquarters appeared to have
very little definite information in regard to the
enemy positions or numbers on the Island. This
is evidence by the fact that on several occasions
we received orders to attack certain positions

or make certain moves and before they could
be carried out they would be countermanded
and other and entirely different orders would
be issued, And on most occasions when
information was requested the reply would be
"The situation is very obscure but there does
not appear to be many Japanese on the Island".
This we knew to be definitely wrong as from
contact with the enemy and from observations
we know there were several thousand opposed
to us. and at the same time they (Fortress H.Q.)
seemed very loth to accept any information
passed on to them and would question the
source or deny the possibility of it being correct.
In one instance during the Mount Cameron show
four enemy Light Cruisers or heavy Destroyers
were observed cruising in a Westerly direction in
the Llama Channel within range of the shore
defence guns. This was reported by telephone
by Major Trist to Battalion H.Q, who relayed it to
Fortress H.Q. and the only reply received was
that it was impossible for any enemy vessels to
be in that locality and to have it re-checked. At
the time the reports was made there were two
other Officers present who verified the position
and it was later discovered that the same vessels
had been reported by Major Bailie who was in
command of the Aberdeen sector, this situation
continued right up to the end as within two hours
of the capitulation we received orders for a
counter attack and Major Trist was in the course
of organizing all our available men including
Transport and Administrative staff to carry this
out at the very time
that the white flag was
run up on the flag staff
at the police station on
Mount Gough. And I
have been informed
that the East Brigade
were not advised of the
c a p i t u l a t i o n until
several hours after it
was in effect....

Lynn Hall, Company
Headquarters, Winnipeg
Grenadiers during the
fighting around the Wong
Nei Chong Gap. Mount
Nicholson is in the
background.
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